

The University of Chicago

TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP IN
THE UNITED STATES ARMY

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
1936

By
JOHN HITE MARION

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CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF BUREAUCRACY

The Rise of Bureaucracies

During the past two centuries there have been at least five closely related social developments which have tended steadily to increase the size of public and private units of organization. These movements have been the products of complex and far-reaching forces in western civilization.

The first of these has been the development of modern science, which has laid the foundation for great increases in physical productivity. One of the most obvious results of this development has been the growth of world population. This, in turn, has had the immediate result of increasing the scope of governmental limits of all kinds. Less direct, perhaps, but no less important has been the effect of increasing population upon the size of private organizations, both commercial and non-commercial.

At the same time that this growth of population was taking place, the stock of wealth-producing capital of the world rose many fold. This permitted the accomplishment of projects of such magnitude and initial cost as previously had rarely been contemplated. In keeping with this widened opportunity for action, groups were organized into units large enough for the performance of the new tasks. Related to the growth of wealth-producing capital, in its causes as well as its effects, has been the widening of the area of the market within which individual units could normally expect to operate. Although this movement has to some

extent been reversed so far as international trade is concerned since the World War, the market areas freely open to trading groups within each of the great nations and empires of the world are still tremendous compared with the usual standards of pre-18th century Europe. Governments, private business groups, philanthropic agencies, churches and political parties have all shared directly or indirectly in the expansion demanded by this broadening of the limits of commerce.

Another matter of primary importance in explaining the existence today of many large-scale organizations is the steadily expanding scale of maximum technological efficiency which scientific research has discovered in a number of spheres. This development is typified by the "scientific management," or "Taylorism" movement. Frederick Taylor began his application of scientific inquiry to the problems of management at a single tool bench. However, as the connections between this single operation and the other activities of an individual plant were discovered, the scope of Taylor's inquiry was correspondingly enlarged. And so it went, until whole groups of factories were co-ordinated together into complex, but highly productive mechanisms.

It is not suggested that these developments are the only explanations of the modern phenomenon of large-scale organization. Each of them surely has had much to do with it. The significant point is that the appearance of large organized groups has been caused by some of the most profound economic and social as well as technological forces of the present age. Their existence is one of the most important of modern social facts.

But what are these "large-scale organizations," and where are they to be found? To begin with, it might be said, in the conventional terms of politics, that some are public and some are

private in character. It should be recognized at once, however that this distinction is not of much service in many cases, since it is difficult to place many modern organizations definitely in either category. One of the most disturbing effects of these groups upon traditional concepts of politics and economics is just this difficulty in treating many of them as either wholly public or wholly private.

Of those which might be called public organizations some are clearly governmental in character, and others only quasi-governmental. Among private organizations some may be called industrial or commercial and the others can, perhaps, be classified no more specifically than as being non-commercial.

In order to make more definite the nature of the types of organization which are called "large-scale," and which are regarded as having such importance for the present period, a few examples may be considered.

The national governments of virtually all the important civilized states of the world constitute such organizations. From the viewpoint of administrative structure many of them should be considered not as single organizations but as groups of organizations. In countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and France, the national governments carry on such extensive and varied functions that their activities must be broken up into many smaller organizations, which may be called Departments, or Ministries, or which may fall outside such orthodox terminology. Examples of the latter type are found in many of the New Deal agencies in the United States, and in such groups as the British Broadcasting Company in Great Britain. In the more or less totalitarian states the scope of governmental organizations is even greater. In Soviet Russia all groups, with such exceptions

as the surviving religious bodies, are under the aegis of the proletarian state.

In the British and French empires, and perhaps in the Belgian, Netherlands, and Japanese empires it is necessary to recognize other major units of organization under the control of national governments. These are the separately organized governments of dominions, colonies, and protectorates within those empires. Among these, the British dominions are, of course, under hardly more than the nominal control of their parent government.

Within many modern states there are other types of truly large-scale governmental organizations. These are the internal political subdivisions, consisting of states or provinces, cities and other regional governments. Many of these, such as Paris, London, California, and Illinois carry on governmental affairs of great magnitude.

Besides these large governmental organizations there are other public groups of impressive size which might be called quasi-governmental. Among such groups are large international organizations. These are built upon a base of national governments, but, in themselves, hardly wield governmental power. Examples are the League of Nations and the International Postal Union. This latter body has only a relatively small staff of its own, to be sure, but so far as its purposes are concerned it might be considered to have jurisdiction over all the postal services of its member states.

Other instances of large organizations which are public in character, but which in the traditional sense of the word are not quite governmental, are public utilities. In the United States the giant railroad systems, the major gas and electric systems, and the wire communications agencies carry on business of an

immense scope.

The foregoing examples of large-scale organization have been types usually considered, in terms of traditional democratic politics, as public. These have been in the past, particularly in English-speaking countries, sharply distinguished from other forms of organization which are called private. This distinction may be accepted for the present purposes of classification with the reservation already made, that it is tending to become less and less valid as the difficulty increases of calling any given organization either wholly public or wholly private.

Among private organizations of considerable size are many industrial, commercial, and financial concerns. The growth of large manufacturing and producing corporations and of merchandising and distributing agencies in the United States has been revealed in the famous study of A. A. Berle, Jr., and G. C. Means of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.¹ This was later supplemented by Mr. Means' report on Industrial Prices and their Relative Inflexibility.² The same process which Messrs. Berle and Means studied in the United States has gone on in other leading nations of the world. Extreme developments have taken place in Germany and Italy where traditional distinctions between private and public organizations are tending to be wiped out completely, and private industrial and commercial concerns are being grouped into large, state-dominated blocs.

Also to be included in the category of private groups are large financial organizations, although here, again, the distinction between public and private functions is more traditional than

¹(New York: Macmillan Co., 1933.)

²Sen. Doc. No. 13, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.

real. Many banks, trust companies, and insurance companies operate on a scale once associated with the affairs of princes and emperors.

There are many other large private organizations besides industrial, commercial, and financial enterprises. A positive bond of unity among these remaining organizations is somewhat difficult to establish. It might be said, however, that they are associations, voluntarily entered into and departed from, which, customarily without primary expectation of financial profits serve some material or spiritual need of their members. In this category would be included such diverse, but extensive organizations as religious bodies, philanthropic agencies, private educational and research groups, trade unions, political parties, and, at least in Great Britain and Sweden, consumers' cooperatives. Each of these organizations maintains a large, permanently organized staff for the accomplishment of its aims.

These, in outline, are the types of large-scale organizations which are considered to be of great importance today. Formerly there were few such organized groups of large size. The various services of government, the Roman Catholic church, and, in the 18th and early 19th centuries, a few great trading companies comprised the list.

Today large-scale organizations flourish in almost all fields of social activity. The appearance of these new agencies is due, as has been suggested, to a combination of powerful factors in modern society. Such organizations are not likely to decline soon in importance. Hence, it is proposed that they be treated as distinctive units of social study.

All of these groups maintain large and more or less permanently organized bodies of personnel. In order that these

enterprises may achieve their objectives their personnel must be efficiently organized, trained, and directed. But what may have been productive of efficiency in terms of small-sized units may not be efficient when applied to big units. In short, the problems commonly associated with the term bureaucracy are no longer only those of governmental administrative services. They exist wherever large groups of people are organized together for the accomplishment of specific objectives.

The word bureaucracy has been given many meanings, but its most useful meaning is that which has recently been advocated for it by Carl. J. Friedrich. In the study which he and Taylor Cole made of the Swiss democracy, the term bureaucracy was, in essence, given the simple meaning of an instrument for the accomplishment of policy, whether such policy be that of a state or of other forms of organization.¹ It was recognized that much cleansing of the term from surface layers of oratorical associations was necessary before it could be used simply to designate the organized groups which conduct large-scale enterprises. The importance of these units and the growing recognition of similarities between all of them justifies the effort to establish a new term of precision. This is a necessary prelude to further analysis.

In a later work, Professor Friedrich has restated and summarized these views by saying that "bureaucracy is neither a system of government nor a collection of disagreeable men doing unnecessary things, but the personnel aspect of administration in all its ramifications and difficulties."²

¹Responsible Bureaucracy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932), pp. 1-28.

²"Responsible Government Service Under the American Constitution," Problems of the American Public Service ("Monographs of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel"; New York, 1935), p. 28.

Others have, in recent years, pointed to common characteristics in various large-scale groups. Two contributors to the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences have, for example, commented upon these similarities. Oliver Sheldon, in his article on Management said:

These three processes—administration, management and organization—are common to all corporate undertakings. They may assume different forms in different enterprises; they may be carried out indifferently or ably; each of those who perform them may participate in all three or concentrate on one alone.

The determination of this fundamental conception is slowly bringing about an understanding of the fact that although the enterprise of a church or school or hospital may be far removed in character from that of steel manufacturing and although both may be far removed from that of an army, all have similar basic principles of technique in their administration, organization and management. The study of these principles is perhaps one of the most modern phases of social scientific research.

H. J. Laski, in his Article on Bureaucracy, showed that the characteristics of a bureaucracy are by no means confined to the services of the state, but that they "operate wherever there is large-scale organization." He pointed out the fact that industrial firms, charitable organizations, trade unions, the Roman Catholic church, and the Communist party in Soviet Russia all display some of the common characteristics of bureaucracies.

And so the large-scale organizations, which are so numerous and so firmly rooted in the present social order, are coming to be recognized as having certain basically similar problems of organization, administration, and management. Instead of treating them all as separate and unrelated phenomena, students of social and political organization are seeking to break down traditional compartment walls and discover the common elements of all such groups. The use of the term bureaucracy in dealing with these common elements can be of assistance. In spite of the surface layers of association which Friedrich has truly said must

be removed from it, there seems to be no word now available which sums up the analogy between the human problems of all large-scale, permanently organized groups better than does bureaucracy.

The Characteristics of Bureaucracies

Before attempting in the following pages of this study to make a more detailed analysis of certain specific problems of bureaucracy, it is necessary first to establish some criteria by which bureaucracies may be defined. What are the characteristics which distinguish a bureaucracy from an uncoordinated mass of individuals, from a small-scale enterprise, or from a large, but not fully "bureaucratized" group?

One possible approach to the definition of bureaucracy is the historical one. Friedrich has remarked that there is, from the viewpoint of the student of bureaucracy, no "absolute antithesis between the Middle Ages and the later periods, or between feudalism and later forms of organizing public functions."¹ A thorough and accurate account of the growth and workings of bureaucracies, and a comparison between different periods of history would be useful in the effort to define the fundamental characteristics of such groups. The obvious magnitude of this task, however, puts it beyond the scope of the present inquiry. It may be recognized in passing that public bureaucracies trace their histories not only into the Middle Ages, but far beyond, and into antiquity. Private bureaucracies, likewise, have a long history which goes back at least to the time of the separation of the Roman Catholic church from the rising nationalities of medieval Europe. Since that event many other types of private bureaucracy also have arisen as the products of the social forces which were

¹Responsible Bureaucracy, p. 26, n. 42.

outlined in the preceding section of this chapter.

Another possible approach to the definition of bureaucracy is that based upon psychological analysis. C. E. Merriam and H. D. Lasswell have shown the importance of individual and group psychology for an understanding of political and social phenomena.¹ The peculiar problems of bureaucracy may some day be thoroughly analyzed from the viewpoint of the psychologist. This would constitute a valuable source of information for the definition of the characteristics of bureaucratic organization. Such characteristics have to do not only with forms and structure, but also with elaborate human reactions to these mechanical scaffoldings. Here again, however, the magnitude and complexity of the analysis required place it beyond the scope of this inquiry.

While recognizing the importance of the historical and psychological approaches to the analysis of the characteristics of bureaucracy, this study must be based upon the more direct method of appraising several existing analyses of the characteristics of large-scale organization, and of attempting a synthesis.

The first matter which may be considered is the ordinary, current usage of the term bureaucracy. It is at once apparent that there are two different meanings associated with the word. One is typified by James M. Beck's Jur Wonderland of Bureaucracy.² In this greatly overstated attack upon the federal bureaucracies, Mr. Beck takes the common attitude that a bureaucracy is a body of irresponsible jobholders who seek alike to expand their powers and reduce their obligations. In other words, this attitude toward

¹C. E. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925); H. D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930); World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1935).

²(New York: Macmillan Co., 1932.)

bureaucracy conceives of the term as a sort of epithet, the use of which is supposed to convey unfavorable implications. This is the usual attitude toward bureaucracy taken in American political controversy. The historic reasons for the existence of large governmental services, the importance of the functions which only they can perform, and the possibility of solving some of the perplexing but not necessarily hopeless problems which their operation creates are alike ignored by this view. Furthermore, this usage attaches the term only to governmental services, and ignores the similarities of the problems found in other large-scale groups.

The other sense in which the term is used is that represented by Friedrich's Responsible Bureaucracy. This is a positive term which designates the form of large-scale organization, normally arranged in logical distributed competencies or bureaus, which is necessary for the harmonious work of numerous people toward a definite goal. In itself the term is neither one of approbation or derogation, but is merely descriptive of large-scale action by organized groups. Such action may be either efficient or inefficient, and either responsive to a higher will than its own or irresponsible. The use of the word in this meaning at once calls up the analogies between all forms of large-scale organization, whether governmental or not.

Between these two meanings lies the bulk of the discussion of bureaucracy. Some writers, as does W. F. Willoughby in his Principles of Public Administration, recognize both meanings. Others, as does H. J. Laski in his article on "Bureaucracy" in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, define the term in the

¹(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1927 [2d printing, 1929, Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, copyright 1927, Institute for Government Research/), pp. 213-15.

common, derogatory sense and then proceed to use it almost entirely as a positive concept of large-scale organization. This ambiguity is understandable, but unfortunate. Common usage will probably continue indefinitely to stress the epithet-like character of the word, but there is no reason why a better definition cannot be agreed upon by students of large-scale organization.

An excellent analysis of the essential elements of bureaucracy in the sense of a positive concept of formal organization is that of Friedrich. He says:

A fully organized bureaucracy exhibits three elementary characteristics, and they usually appear in the order which they occupy in the following description. Offices or functions are distributed carefully and rationally among the members of the organization and then arranged into a whole, so as to produce an elaborate system of competencies or jurisdictions. The process by which this distribution is brought about may be called differentiation, and the combination of the functions as differentiated, integration. The whole process constitutes a late phase in the division of labor. Secondly, the powers of control and coercion attached to these offices are carefully circumscribed and arranged in the way of a pyramid, so that several officers of fairly equal power are directed and coordinated by a superior officer having power over them and so on up the line. The dynamic whole of these relationships of coordination and subordination up and down the line may be called the hierarchy, and the process by which the hierarchy is created and maintained, centralization. Thirdly, definite and publicly known qualifications are required for the fulfillment of the several functions as differentiated, and since such qualifications necessitate rather elaborate preparation of the candidate, they depend upon fixed salary, secure tenure, and regular promotion, in anticipation of which the candidate undertakes to secure the necessary training. This process may be called professionalization, and is analogous to similar tendencies throughout the length and breadth of our industrial society.¹

Professor Friedrich has recognized his debt to Max Weber.² The three characteristics which Friedrich discovers in bureaucracy are closely related to the six characteristics which

¹"Responsible Government Service under the American Constitution," Problems of the American Public Service, pp. 22-23.

²Responsible Bureaucracy, p. 17, n. 26.

Weber found. Weber's analysis merits extensive quotation and careful consideration. He says, in part, that

The specific manner of functioning of modern officialdom appears in the following points:

I. It is based upon the principle of fixed powers, which are generally organized according to rules, that is, laws or administrative regulations. This means: First, there is a definite distribution of the regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed entity; these activities are known as official duties;—Second, the executive powers required to fulfill these duties are likewise distributed in a fixed manner and the coercive means for enforcement assigned to them, whether they are physical or spiritual, are strictly limited by rules;—Third, for the regular and continued fulfillment of the duties so distributed and for the execution of the rights corresponding to these duties, definite arrangements have been made by the employment of persons with qualifications laid down along general lines.

II. It is based upon the principle of the official hierarchy and the order of 'instances' (stages of appeal), that is, a definitely fixed system of subordination of the several authorities under high authorities for purposes of surveillance,—a system which at the same time affords a well regulated possibility to the governed of appealing from a lower authority to the next higher authority. Whenever the type is fully developed this official hierarchy is organized monocratically.' The principle of the hierarchic order of 'instances' is found in secular and ecclesiastical as well as all other bureaucratic organizations, for example in large party organizations and large private organizations.

III. The execution of modern official duties is based upon written documents (Akten) which are kept in the original or in the rough draft, and furthermore upon a staff of lower officials and clerks of all kinds. The aggregate of the officials employed in a given division of the government and of the corresponding apparatus including the papers is called a bureau (in private management an office).

IV. Official activity, at least so far as it has a specialized character—and this again is typically modern—normally presupposes a thorough professional training. This is not only true of government officials but also increasingly true of modern managers and employees of a private management.

V. In the fully developed organism the official activity claims the entire energy of the official even if the time of his official duties in the bureau may be definitely limited. In normal instances this is likewise only the product of a long development both in public and private office.

VI. The discharge of public duty by the officials is carried out according to general more-or-less definite and more-or-less complete rules which are capable of being learned. A knowledge of these rules, therefore, represents a special discipline, for example administrative jurisprudence, theory of public administration, theory of business administration, etc. which must be known by the officials.¹

An interesting analysis to compare with Friedrich's and Weber's is that contained in a book written by James D. Mooney, president of the General Motors Export Company, and Alan C. Reiley. This book is written from the viewpoint of, and for the benefit of, the managers of large-scale industrial organizations. It contains a survey of the structures of many large organizations, such as governments, armies, industries, and churches, and also includes an effort to abstract the principles underlying the forms of such organizations.

The first principle of all organization, say Mooney and Reiley, is the coordinative principle. In accordance with this principle all organized groups order and arrange their various actions so as to produce a unified effort in a common direction. This is an all-inclusive principle, embracing all the other principles of organization. "The term expresses the principles of organization in toto; nothing less."² Other principles are simply those "through which coordination operates, and thus becomes effective."³

The next principle stated by Mooney and Reiley is the scalar principle of organization.⁴ This calls for the establishment of steps or scales of authority; in other words, the creation

¹Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Abteilung III, Grundriss der Sozialökonomik (Tübingen verlag von J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1925), pp. 651-52.

²Onward Industry! (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), p. 19.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 31.

of a hierarchy. This is common to all large organized groups. It is required not merely for the purposes of coercion and control, but because of the problems of exercising constructive leadership over large numbers.

A third principle according to Monney and Reiley is the functional principle of organization.¹ This general rule calls for differentiation or distinction between kinds of duties. Some within the organization perform one kind of task, others, another. This functional differentiation is more or less formalized in every organization into the categories represented by such terms as departments, sections, divisions, services, etc. One part of such functionalism which, according to Mooney and Reiley, does not quite reach the status of a principle in its own right is the staff phase of functionalism. This has to do with those members of an organization who provide services of information, advice, and supervision to persons who hold broadly responsible posts in the hierarchy. The possession of such staff agencies in one form or another is a common aspect of all large-scale organizations, but this is not recognized as creating a principle which is distinct from the more general functional principle.

Each of these analyses is extremely interesting and valuable in connection with the search for the common traits of large-scale organizations, which in this discussion are called bureaucracies. Friedrich's list of bureaucratic characteristics—integrated division of labor, hierarchical centralization, and professionalization—reveals a realistic grasp of the essentials of large-scale organization. Weber's analysis of bureaucracy of "officialdom" into the characteristics of definitely distributed powers, hierarchical "stages of appeal," separately organized

¹ Ibid., p. 45.

bureaus, preliminary training of personnel, "full time" or professional character of work, and the existence of more or less definite bodies of knowledge or rules whereby work must be transacted is both penetrating and realistic. Likewise, the principles of coordination, scalar organization, and functional organization which are advanced by Mooney and Reiley indicate a true perception of the nature of large permanently organized groups.

There are certain similarities, as well as certain differences between these analyses which may be noted. In general, it seems that while the statements of Weber and Friedrich are much more extensive and more complete than that of Mooney and Reiley, the latter's approach to the restricted field of the theory of organization is superior.

The universality of some kind of hierarchical structure in all large-scale organizations cannot be doubted. All the analyses which have been quoted recognize this fact. It is believed that the scalar principle as identified and explained by Mooney and Reiley, however, suggests the method of a somewhat more complete representation of the process than does either the centralization and hierarchy identified by Friedrich, or the formally distributed powers, and hierarchic "stages of appeals" of Weber.

The aspect of hierarchical structure which Friedrich appears to stress is its usefulness in the exercise of authority and compulsion from above. He says:

Secondly, the powers of control and coercion attached to these offices are carefully circumscribed and arranged in the way of a pyramid, so that several officers of fairly equal power are directed and coordinated by a superior officer having power over them and so on up the line.¹

¹"Responsible Government Service under the American Constitution," Problems of the American Public Service, p. 22.

Weber similarly stresses this element of control and "monocratic" rule. Mooney and Reiley in addition to this phase also refer to, but do not fully develop, in their analysis of hierarchy (or "the scalar chain") another aspect of hierarchical organization, namely, the necessity of the scheme for the exercise of leadership.

It is axiomatic that one person cannot immediately and effectively direct the work of more than a very limited number of other people. If this were not so, then one person of supreme talent might directly supervise and guide the work of every other individual in a large organization and there would be no necessity for a hierarchy. The fact is, however, that one mind is hardly capable of exercising constructive and positive supervision over the work of more than half a dozen other minds. This limited span of attention is the real reason for the existence of hierarchical organization. Instead of an impossible one-to-many relationship it creates a series of one-to-a-few relationships in each of which the normal interaction between the program and personality of the leader and the work of the followers can take place. This effectiveness of contact which is made possible by hierarchical organization can be regarded either as a means of exercising restraint and assuring "responsibility," or as the necessary basis of effectively directed positive action. Both are certainly aspects of all large-scale organization.

Each of the analyses which has been quoted also recognizes the universality of some type of functional division within large organizations. Friedrich and Weber do not make a clear effort to separate the process of dividing up a group between machinists, lawyers, salesmen, accountants, and the like, and the wider process of division between foremen, vice-presidents, clerks, or bureau chiefs. Mooney and Reiley, on the other hand, recognize the dif-

ference, to use their example, between the division of an organization into generals and colonels, and the division into infantrymen and artillerymen.¹ The latter cleavage is what they consider to be true functional differentiation. This appears to be generally correct since hierarchical organization contains a good part of what is sometimes rather loosely considered functional differentiation.²

It should also be pointed out that the general process of functional differentiation as defined here includes the division between ordinary line or operating activities such as the work of printers, forest rangers, salesmen, etc., and the work of specialized services, or "housekeeping" activities such as those of engineers, budget bureaus, personnel agencies, etc. The latter are sometimes referred to as "staff" services, but they are, it is believed, more correctly considered as simply forms of general functional differentiation. True staff services are entirely different from both line and "housekeeping" services.

The creation of staff services is, according to Mooney and Reiley, merely one phase of functional differentiation. By the term "staff services" Mooney and Reiley mean the assisting and supplementary functions embodied in information, advice, and supervision which are rendered directly to persons who are in positions of responsibility within the hierarchy. It would seem to be better, however, to regard these staff services not as merely

¹Op. cit., p. 45.

²However, the impression which might be conveyed by this illustration that hierarchical structure in a military organization is embodied wholly in gradations of formal rank, such as general and colonel, is inaccurate. The hierarchy, or line of command, for any specific activity, runs according to a series of offices or centers of authority rather than merely according to the gradations of rank of the personnel of the army.

phases of functionalism, but as manifestations of another principle of bureaucratic organization, namely, that of coordination. Mooney and Reiley recognize such a principle, but they define it so broadly as to be almost meaningless, that is, as "the principles of organization in toto." The importance of the integration of differentiated functions and offices was also pointed out by Friedrich.

Here again, as in the case of hierarchical organization, the reason for the importance of the principle is due to the limitations of the human mind. In a large hierarchy of offices, the person at the top of the pyramid is charged with a staggering responsibility. The theory is simple and true enough as far as it goes, that by limiting the number of people any one person must direct, a close and effective supervision can result from the mere mechanics of hierarchical organization. However, the higher an office is in the pyramid, the less its duties become those of handling a limited amount of repetitive details in accordance with a superior policy, and the more such duties become those of weighing a great mass of details in the light of some kind of total situation in order to create new policy. As the complexity of the details which must be so weighed increases, it in turn becomes less and less possible for one person to know about and give effective consideration to such details, and more and more vitally important that they be so considered. This necessity, which is manifest in all large-scale organizations, has caused the creation of staff services. Such services may be highly specialized, as in armies, or they may be inherent in the whole structure, as Mooney and Reiley say is the case with certain levels of the organization of the Roman Catholic church.¹ They may be performed as a result of informal custom by individu-

¹Op. cit., pp. 266-71.

als who also have other duties of an administrative or technical nature, or they may be carried out by more or less obscure assistants to the chief of the organization. In some fashion, however, staff services as here defined must be performed if the organization is to function, for they provide the necessary coordination of detail without which hierarchical officials would be unable to act effectively. The universality of staff services leads to the belief that they represent a principle of large-scale organization, which may be called the principle of coordination, and which is distinct from both hierarchy and functionalism. One essential characteristic of such coordinative activities, or staff services, is that they possess no authority whatsoever of their own within the hierarchy. They merely coordinate and make humanly possible the work of certain individuals within the hierarchy.

There is another characteristic which appears to be common to all large-scale organizations, and that is the tendency toward professionalization. Mooney and Reiley do not discuss this, perhaps because they consider it outside the scope of their particular inquiry. One of the three basic characteristics ascribed to bureaucracies by Friedrich was, it will be remembered, this process of professionalization. Weber recognized it by implication in the quotation which has been given, and later in the same work showed specifically that professionalization is a characteristic of all bureaucracies.¹

The older and more thoroughly established a bureaucracy is, the greater is the likelihood that all the members of the organization will be regarded as practitioners of a common profession. Armies and churches, two of the oldest bureaucracies, show this professionalization in a highly developed form. Governmental

¹Op. cit., pp. 651-52.

administrative services generally constitute distinct professions, with required types of preliminary training, and a more or less uniform technique of applying certain bodies of knowledge. Wherever this process has gone on to considerable lengths, the members of the bureaucracy are as thoroughly identified with their profession as are the members of the traditional three learned professions of theology, medicine, and law. In the case of newer, and less thoroughly developed bureaucracies, the process of professionalization has not gone so far. This is true in private industrial and commercial bureaucracies and in more or less unformed and undeveloped civil services such as many of those in the United States. In these cases the existence of separate professions for each type of bureaucracy is not commonly recognized. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of the existence of an inclusive profession which would contain all the personnel of certain types of bureaucracy, for example a large industrial or commercial enterprise, in the same sense that all the personnel of an army is contained in the military profession. The differences between the various ranks and the several functions in a business corporation are much more readily noticed than any inclusive professional bond. This doubtless argues that in private industrial and commercial large-scale organizations and in some of the other groups which do not appear to have developed, as yet, into distinct professions the process of bureaucratization has not gone on to full development.

The obvious differences between the upper and lower ranks of the hierarchy and between the types of duties performed by functionally differentiated groups within large-scale organizations tend to create another characteristic of bureaucracies. The personnel of these organizations tend to fall into more or

less clearly defined internal statuses or categories. Each such status has its own set of rights and duties, and its particular degree of authority and prestige within the bureaucracy. Such terms as "white collar workers," "laborers," and "the management," and the gulf between those who receive salaries and those who receive wage payments suggest the existence of such statuses in business bureaucracies. The differences in a highly developed civil service such as the British, between the two sides represented on Whitley Councils¹ and the distinct differentiation between officers and men in all armies are further indications of such statuses in large-scale organizations.

In the expanding and less highly developed governmental services such as most of those of the United States, these internal differentiations are inherent although not always fully recognized. Positions typified by such titles as Chief of Bureau and Administrator are entirely different with respect to duties, authority, and general standing in the group from positions such as Personnel Director, Chief Engineer, and Solicitor. These latter positions are, in turn, sharply distinguished from clerical and manipulative positions. Perhaps the reasons for the existence of separate statuses within a bureaucracy are simply inherent in the workings of hierarchical organization and functional differentiation. On the other hand, the tendency toward the establishment of internal levels of status appears to be so pronounced in almost all bureaucracies that it should be regarded as a distinct process.

Accordingly, then, there are five notable characteristics which define the large-scale organizations, or bureaucracies, whose rise to importance was outlined in the first section of this

¹L. D. White, Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp.38-40.

chapter. These characteristics are hierarchical structure, functional differentiation, coordinative services, professionalization, and internal levels of status. It is not suggested, of course, that these are the only characteristics which may be identified. These are sufficient, however, to distinguish and to identify the bureaucratic type of organization. The processes summed up in these five characteristics are common in varying degrees, to all large-scale organizations. Within these bounds the complex personal relationships and adjustments which are the essentials of the problems of bureaucracy take place.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF LEADERSHIP IN A BUREAUCRACY

Thus far this study has developed the fact of the existence of many forms of large-scale organization, and has outlined some of the characteristics which pertain to all such groups. In public and in private life the large unit of organization is no longer the unusual phenomenon it was in former days. Such traditionally governmental problems as "red tape," routine, inflexibility, and lack of integration are now realized to pertain not simply to governmental organizations as such, but to all forms of large-scale organization. Wherever size and complexity combine to produce in enterprises the tendencies and characteristics which were discussed in the preceding chapter, there will be found typically bureaucratic problems of organization, administration, and management.

This similarity of structure and operation between all types of organized, large-scale action suggests the value of comparative studies. Most of the principal forms of bureaucratic organization have been the subject of extensive separate study. The administrative problems of government, business, public utilities, armies, and educational institutions have each been studied within their separate fields. This is, of course, quite proper since each type of organization has its own peculiar aspects. However, there has, at least until recent years, been too little effort to recognize and to study administrative problems which are not limited to any one type or kind of organization, but which transcend the bounds of a single enterprise and are inherent

in large-scale organization as such. If comparative studies of this nature be effectively made then the experience and information available for the benefit of any particular enterprise would be greatly widened. In devising a solution for the special problems of a given organization it would be possible to call upon the records and practices of many other organizations and institutions. Instead of a historical background limited to a single enterprise, or type of organization, the policies and methods of numerous institutions would be available for consideration.

Obviously, the success of comparative administrative studies such as are here suggested, depends first of all upon the possibility of a clear and definite formulation of specific problems which are common to all types of bureaucracies. It is believed that the problem of internal leadership is one which is inherent in all forms of large-scale organization.

The general concept of leadership has been analyzed and defined in many ways. A bibliographical bulletin published by the School of Education of Indiana University¹ lists and classifies a number of the approaches to the subject of leadership which have been made in recent years. Among the analyses which are quoted, there is a wide divergence as to the basic definition and classifications of leadership. Studies published since this bulletin appeared have also differed materially from each other in their appraisals of leadership.²

¹H. L. Smith and L. M. Krueger, A Brief Summary of Literature on Leadership, Bulletin of the School of Education, Indiana University, Vol. IX, No. 4 (Bloomington, Indiana: Bureau of Co-operative Research, Indiana University School of Education, 1933).

²Richard Schmidt, "Leadership," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences; Emory S. Bogardus, Leaders and Leadership (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1934), p. 15; Paul Pigors, Leadership or Domination (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935), pp. 16, 48, 74.

The basic difficulty faced by students of leadership is that of dissociating the factor of leadership from its moorings in the specific environment where it is found. Each instance in which one individual controls the action of a group of people involves so many special and peculiar circumstances that the extraction of generalizations which are valid for all leadership is extremely difficult. Even the simplest analyses which attempt to embrace the whole scope of leadership are forced to adopt extremely fragile classifications. For example, one writer defines leadership as "the relation between an individual and a group built around some common interest and behaving in a manner directed or determined by him." He then classifies leadership into the two types of a) representative or symbolic leadership, wherein the leader satisfies the aspirations of a group by acting in its behalf, and b) creative leadership, which emerges when an individual becomes the propulsive force for a certain value or complex of values.¹ This analysis, which is somewhat related to Cowley's earlier distinction between "headmen" and true leaders² contains an obvious element of truth, in that many of the manifestations of leadership, as the writer has defined it, are associated with interest groups or institutions which were not created or assembled by their leaders, but were already in existence when the leaders appeared and became their spokesmen. Moreover, on many occasions individuals have seemingly been both the creators and leaders of their groups.

However, the representative or symbolic leader must continually interpret and define the aspirations of his group, and

¹Schmidt, op. cit.

²W. H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXIII (1928), 144-57.

this verges very closely upon the role assigned to the creative leader. Also, the creative leader who appears to be the propulsive force for some set of values must deal with values which appeal to his followers by satisfying some expressed or unexpressed aspirations of the group, and this bears a close relationship to the function of the representative or symbolic leader.

Some of the other and more involved analyses of leadership, such as "(1) direct or indirect; (2) partizan or scientific; (3) social, executive, or mental; (4) autocratic, paternalistic, or democratic; or (5) specialists in leadership, such as the prophet, the saint, the experts, and the boss"¹ are even more likely to break down when applied to specific cases.

The difficulty of making valid, generalizations about the entire range of leadership in the present state of psychological and sociological knowledge suggests the value of studies which are limited to specific and closely defined environments. Studies of this nature have been made of political party leadership by C. E. Merriam,² H. F. Gosnell,³ J. T. Salter,⁴ and R. Michels.⁵ Ordway Tead has pioneered in the study of leadership in large-scale organizations generally. His most recent book is largely given to an examination of the methods which must be followed

¹Bogardus, op. cit., p. 15.

²Four Party Leaders (New York: Macmillan Co., 1926).

³Boss Platt and His New York Machine (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1924).

⁴Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935).

⁵Political Parties, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Hearst's International Library Co. 1915).

⁶The Art of Leadership (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935).

by the leaders of such groups to secure the loyalty and cooperation of their followers, and to accomplish desirable results.

Doubtless all manifestations of leadership, in whatever environment or context they are found, have common elements. However, leadership in a large-scale organization is subject to a number of special conditions which are caused by the nature of bureaucratic structure and activity. These limiting and conditioning factors must be recognized and interpreted before progress may be made in the analysis of the problems of leadership in bureaucracies.

The basic assumption concerning a bureaucratic organization is that it is an instrument or agency for the achievement of definite objectives. In order to work consistently toward the attainment of its goals such a group must be effectively guided and controlled by a rational intelligence which is capable of understanding the goals and of planning and directing programs of action for the group which will be likely to accomplish the desired results. The problem of bureaucratic leadership is therefore, concerned with all of the organizational and administrative aspects of bureaucratic activity which influence and make possible the exercise of effective guidance and control. It is possible to identify and define certain major elements of this problem which are common to all large-scale organizations. However, it must be recognized that the scope of the problem is extremely broad, and that its manifestations vary somewhat in different bureaucracies. Hence, there may be identified not only a fundamental problem of leadership which confronts all bureaucratic organizations, but also a special problem of leadership which must be solved by each bureaucracy in conformity with its individual requirements. The aim of the present chapter is to

analyze the basic elements of the problem which are common to all large-scale organizations.

In the first place, the effective exercise of direction and control over the huge masses of individuals and materials which constitute a large-scale organization is only possible if certain organizational requirements are satisfied. There must be established within the organization a hierarchy which extends from the center of authority to the external limits of the group. Moreover, the exercise of rational and effective direction over a group which performs large and complex tasks is possible only if the group is in some degree divided and controlled functionally. This type of control may coincide in its lower levels with hierarchical control, but the two types of authority tend to be sharply distinguished in the higher levels of the organization. Finally, it is possible to control by conscious intelligence the activities of a large-scale organization only if the principal hierarchical centers of authority of the group are served by coordinative or staff agencies which concentrate the details of the business of the organization into a manageable focus.

Thus, there are three phases of bureaucratic leadership which may be identified. The first is hierarchical leadership, or the control which is exerted over an organization by the aggregate of officials having broad and inclusive authority to direct the work of others. This phase may or may not be distinct from the second, which is functionalized leadership. This is the leadership exercised by officials who direct the technical and special services into which the group is divided. In some organizations these two types of leadership tend to be almost undifferentiated. Probably no group distinguishes so clearly between the inclusive authority of hierarchical leadership and the

specialized influence of functionalized leadership as does an army. The third phase of bureaucratic leadership is the coordinative leadership of staff officials who exert their influence only through their services to hierarchical leaders.

The leadership of any given bureaucracy is exercised by the officials within the group who perform these three types of duties. They are leaders of the organization in the sense that they shape and direct the work of the whole group. No bureaucracy sets its own ultimate goals, but given the elemental objectives, these leaders guide the rest of the organization.

The functions of bureaucratic leaders differ fundamentally from the functions of the subordinate members of large-scale organizations. The assumption that a bureaucracy is an organization devoted to the accomplishment of a definite program of action carries with it the demand that all the parts of the system be closely knit together and function according to a unified plan. This means in practice that the subordinate workers can have very little to say about general policies and programs.

On the other hand, those placed toward the top of the group are called on for decisions and plans affecting policy. Their work requires not merely application of the official program to the details of their work, but also synthesis and coordination, and the direction of the activity of many other persons.

These two kinds of activity call for different personal qualities and training. The way to the individual growth and wide information necessary in the case of the director and supervisor lies in rounded experience and acquisition of ever-increasing kinds of knowledge. Individual initiative, and the freedom to conceive and execute new ideas are important in the development of a man called on to undertake the guidance of group action. The

way to efficiency of performance of the limited, and often routine tasks which make up many of the activities of the lower ranks of a large organization, however, lies in the strict performance by many individuals of duties set for them by central control. Repetition and routine characterize a large part of such work.

Hence, the personal qualities which are directly associated with work in the lower levels of a bureaucracy are different from those associated with work in its higher levels. This results in the necessity for a most careful adjustment between these two classes of work. As vacancies occur or new posts are created in the upper levels of the bureaucracy it becomes necessary to fill them with persons from outside those particular ranks. There are two kinds of qualifications which are important in such cases. One is an adequate knowledge of the technical details of the bureaucracy, and the other is a broadly developed personality which is capable both of constructive thinking and of directing the work of many other people.

The normal place to find ample knowledge of the detailed functioning of the various separate lines of activity of the bureaucracy is, of course, in the lower ranks of the organization. However, due to the necessary character of the work of those individuals lower down in the hierarchy, there is no reason to suppose that their ranks constitute the normal place to find the second kind of qualification, namely, wide experience and the habit of leading and taking the initiative. This, of course, is not to say that experience in subordinate posts is a bar to ability to perform satisfactorily the duties of higher positions. It is merely to say that there is no essential relationship between the two factors.

The problem of bureaucratic leadership, then, becomes one

of effecting a satisfactory adjustment between the first-hand knowledge of technical detail which is normally acquired by preliminary experience in minor positions, and the breadth of experience and habit of leadership which can only be developed by varied and responsible activity. Such an adjustment, no matter how efficacious in the production of individuals with the required knowledge and talents for bureaucratic leadership will not be truly satisfactory unless it is accepted as reasonable by the whole organization. Everyone demands the opportunity for some advancement and progress, and this must not be sacrificed to supposed efficiency in the selection and training of the higher officials.

There are several possible responses to this dilemma, and few bureaucracies follow any one of them exclusively. Most bureaucracies rely upon a combination of several of them. Each of these methods has its advantages and its disadvantages.

One such response is the practice of introducing persons directly into high posts in the bureaucracy from outside the organization entirely. This is more or less common in a number of types of bureaucracies. In governmental services this method may be the result of such causes as spoils politics, party allegiance in one-party dictatorships, or the complete lack of adequately qualified personnel in the lower ranks of the group. The latter situation frequently exists in the United States. This method is, of course, employed when entirely new governmental services are established. In private bureaucracies it may result from the transfer of persons of special talent from one organization into a similar one, or it may be caused by some variety of nepotism or favoritism.

This method has the conceivable advantage of making possible the selection of officials with proven executive and admin-

istrative ability, or of special scientific or technical skill. It has the disadvantages of being likely to injure the morale of the group by bringing in outsiders over the heads of members of the organization. Also, no matter how superior the qualifications of the officials thus selected, those officials must go through a period of months or years in which they are orienting themselves within the organization, and during this time their contributions to the activity of the group may be slight. Of course, where the reason for such selection is merely family or political or personal favoritism, and the incoming official has no particular qualifications for his work, all of the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the scheme operate.

Another response to the problem of leadership recruitment in a bureaucracy is the frank establishment of statuses or classifications. New entrants start in at the bottom of one or another of such classifications and expect, by and large, to remain in their particular category for the rest of their careers. They may progress to the top of their status, but advancement beyond that point is not normally provided for, or expected. The bearing of this arrangement on recruitment for the top ranks of the hierarchy is that those who are ultimately to be chosen for such posts start in at the beginning with that expectation, and are given special training and opportunities for development which are likely to produce the personal qualities required for their duties. The training and development of those in other statuses is also consciously directed toward the more specialized and technical qualifications of their work. This procedure is followed by highly developed civil services, such as the British, and by military organizations. It is also probably practiced to some extent in private industry, although it is not formally reorganized.

In general, wherever the characteristic of internal levels of status is highly developed in a bureaucracy, the top posts in the hierarchy are likely to be filled by persons who were specially recruited and directly trained for such positions.

This procedure is well calculated to produce individuals of genuine capacity at each of the levels of the organization. The preliminary experience of high officials is likely to be varied and well chosen and the ability to exercise broadly responsible leadership can be tested at an early age and developed throughout a whole career. Similarly, technicians and specialists can be selected and trained in accordance with rational and effective policies. The danger of this arrangement, however, lies in its possible effects upon the morale of those who are barred from advancement to the upper positions of the organization.

Another kind of approach to the problem of bureaucratic leadership is the unusually rapid advancement of particularly promising younger people from lower positions to higher ones. By this means, those whom the controlling authorities believe to be most likely to develop into able leaders are promoted at a much more rapid rate than the average and given the training which would be valuable for their proposed work. Thus, instead of long and routine years at a specialized duty these individuals have the opportunity, while yet young enough to profit from it, of learning many aspects of the work of the organization and of directing complex and extensive activities. This is the policy which is probably most common in business bureaucracies and in some other less formalized groups. However, this procedure does take place to some extent even in the most formalized bureaucracies. In the British civil service, for example, it is not unknown, though relatively rare, for a man to start toward the bottom and

progress from class to class, and even to the highest posts.

This method has the advantage of affording some opportunity of high and rapid promotion to everyone. It may result in the recognition and reward of ability wherever it is found. It also makes possible the first-hand knowledge and rounded experience which were said to be essential. If properly applied this method may be the best of all in providing able and well-qualified leaders, and in promoting a satisfactory morale and esprit de corps. If improperly applied, however, either because of incompetent selection or because of personal favoritism, or if persons of adequate native intelligence and ability are not available in the lower ranks of the organization, this procedure may have disastrous effects both upon the quality of leaders, and upon the group morale.

Another means of selecting persons for high positions in a bureaucracy is by the operation of the principle of seniority. This method could not, for obvious reasons, be relied upon exclusively by any organization. There is very little to commend this method as a uniform means of recruiting the leaders of an organization. Probably it has never been thoroughly applied in any group which has had to perform extensive and difficult functions. However, the application of the principle of seniority as a means of making possible some promotion for everyone within a certain level of positions has much to commend it. Wherever the difficulty of distinguishing between the quality of the work and the ability of various individuals is greater than the possible danger to morale and efficiency from making mistakes in such distinctions, the seniority principle has a useful role.

The abstract question of which method of selection of bureaucratic leaders is best cannot be answered definitely. No

one doctrine could possibly be adhered to with unvarying strictness by a large-scale organization operating over a long period of time. The answer to the riddle of leadership depends too much upon the circumstances of the specific case. However, within the framework of a bureaucracy, these four methods are the basic answers. Some workable combination or grouping of them is necessary if a bureaucracy is to achieve positive and predetermined results.

Very closely related to the problem of the selection of bureaucratic leaders is the problem of their training and development. The method or methods of selection determine in a broad way the kinds of training and development which are possible and necessary. Individuals who come directly into high posts from outside the organization require a more or less systematic orientation in their new environment, whatever talents and skills they may have brought with them. When the leaders of a bureaucracy are selected from a special classification in the group it is possible, if the necessary steps are taken, to provide for them an organized and continuing course of training and development from the time they enter the classification until they reach the highest positions in the organization. Similarly, the selection of leaders from among promising subordinates in the group at large makes it possible to furnish the individuals so chosen with the experience and training necessary to develop efficient leadership in the organization. Partial reliance upon the principle of seniority in the original selection of bureaucratic leaders tends to make it difficult to establish effective methods of training and, at the same time, makes it necessary that there be some means of improving and making the best use of such talent as does become available.

The proper arrangement of the methods of recruiting and

training bureaucratic leaders depends in any given case partly upon the function and objective of the bureaucracy and partly upon the larger social environment in which the bureaucracy operates. If a bureaucracy is called upon for swiftness and decisiveness of action, as is the case with armies and business enterprises, this constitutes a distinct demand upon the quality of its leadership. If social issues of tremendous magnitude are at stake, as is the case with many governmental services, this has its effect upon the kind of leadership needed. If the bureaucracy deals with subtle personal adjustments and values, as is true of churches and educational institutions, or if it handles refined and elaborate scientific work, other calls are made upon the leadership of the group. Similarly, a social environment steeped in an equalitarian tradition, such as the American, has one effect upon the qualifications and recruitment of bureaucratic leaders, while a social environment accustomed to sharp and obvious class differentiations has another. In the particular instance of the United States, the relative fluidity of social institutions, and the frontier traditions of individualism and expansion have deeply influenced both the substance and the rationalization of the recruitment of leadership in all spheres.

There are many possible combinations and special arrangements of the methods of recruitment and training for leadership which have been discussed, and comparative study of different organizations will reveal extensive and interesting variations and applications of these basic practices. Such comparative study should benefit any group, no matter how well it may have solved its problems of leadership. It should particularly benefit those organizations which have not yet evolved a stable and effective policy for the selection and development of their leaders. Among

such groups are most of the governmental services of the United States including national, state, and local agencies.

The basis of selection and the type and quality of training of the individuals holding important administrative and executive positions in American public services are extremely varied. The avenues by which such positions are reached include party politics, law, business experience, university experience, long years of employment in the public service, and a host of other channels. The study made by Professor MacMahon of federal bureau chiefs some years ago scratched the surface of this problem in the national government.¹ Other, and more up-to-date studies would reveal an even more remarkable picture of the diversity of the backgrounds of the men who exercise the functions of administrative and executive direction and coordination in American public services.

Such lack of stable policy is sometimes justified as being necessary to maintain a democratic and responsive attitude on the part of public services. Whatever merit there may be in this argument, it would seem to be far outweighed by the obvious difficulties which the absence of a tried and effective policy for the recruitment and training of the leaders of the American public services creates. The urgency and importance of the contemporary and emerging social issues with which governmental services are compelled to deal demands the adoption of policies and practices which will make possible the orderly and dependable selection and training of able leaders to direct the work of government. Wholesale levies upon law offices, university faculties, and

¹Arthur MacMahon, "Selection and Tenure of Bureau Chiefs in the National Administration of the United States," American Political Science Review, XX (1926), 548-582, 770-811.

private industry are poor substitutes for a method whereby ability and training are acquired and developed within the organization and in terms of its specific tasks.

Important as is the civil service reform movement in the United States for the assurance of a minimum level of capacity, it is perhaps unfortunate that the limitations of civil service systems were not long ago frankly recognized. Although by no means inconsistent with effective administration, civil service systems in themselves do not contain the essential elements of positive efficiency. One respect in which they need to be supplemented by definite policies is in the recruitment and training of higher officials of the organization.

In the case of governmental services, as in the case of all bureaucracies, there is no one formula which solves this problem. There is a need for the careful comparative analysis of extensive data dealing with various methods of solution. In regard to the particular problems of the American governmental services there are many fruitful sources of ideas and practices which could be explored. Most obviously pertinent, perhaps, are the governmental services of other nations. Great Britain and France, for example, have effective means for the selection and development of a high level of ability in the upper ranks of their public services. The value of the comparative study of the administrative problems of the public services of the various nations has long been recognized. The extensive literature upon this subject testifies to this fact. However, it must be recognized that such comparisons are merely analogies, and in no sense exact parallels since the historical backgrounds, forms of organization and administrative methods of all public services differ widely.

If public administrative services be viewed not merely as organs for the expression of state will but as manifestations of the common phenomenon of large-scale organization, then many analogies to the practices and problems of any given public service will be recognized in addition to the methods and policies of other public services. Further light could be shed upon the nature of the problems of public services, for example, by examining the practices of large industrial and commercial organizations. Similarly, churches, armies, educational institutions, and philanthropic agencies all might be canvassed for ideas and practices which would have value for the American public services.

Instead of attempting a general survey of all such organizations, however, most of the remainder of this study will be devoted to an analysis of one particular form of organization and to a statement of the way in which it undertakes to supply itself with able and qualified leaders.

This organization is the Regular Army of the United States, which is a highly developed form of large-scale organization. Its long experience with the problems of mass action has resulted in many organizational and administrative efficiencies which would well repay extensive comparative study. No other institution in the United States has ever faced problems of as great magnitude and complexity as those which confronted the United States Army during the World War. The precision with which military organization is geared to the basic requirements of large-scale action is attested to by the fact that the unparalleled expansion demanded of the Army during the World War resulted not in complete breakdown and confusion, but within less than two years, in a functioning and effective organization.¹ As a source

¹John Dickinson, The Making of an Army (New York: The

of analogy and comparative data for the student of large-scale organization, the army is without superior among American institutions. It is almost the sole organization in the United States which has operated on a large scale over a long period of time and has at the same time been free to develop in accordance with rational and clearly formulated policies. That is to say that except for some of the other governmental services of the United States, whose full development has been consistently checked by the political and social environment, there are perhaps no other indigenous institutions in America which have functioned on a large scale over a sufficiently long period of time to distinguish and to formalize the essential attributes of efficiently organized mass action. This is not to assert, of course, that the actual operation of the Army at any given point is necessarily efficient, or that the institutions and practices of the Army constitute the only feasible solutions of the problems of large-scale organization. It is merely to say that the Army has been exceptional in the extent to which it has first consciously identified and defined those problems which are fundamental to all organized large-scale action and then evolved solutions for those problems in accordance with clear and definite principles. It is this rationalized and formalized character which makes military institutions of particular interest to the student of large-scale organization. In military organizations can be discerned the full development and formal expression of many trends which lie dormant or unrecognized in most types of organization.

Century Co., 1922); General J. J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931); Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker—America at War (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1931); General P. C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Doran and Co., 1932); Major General James G. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917-1919 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1936).

The interest of the United States Army in connection with the present study of bureaucratic leadership lies first in the organizational framework of that institution which makes possible the exercise of effective leadership; second, in the processes which govern the recruitment, promotion, assignment, and retirement of Army leaders; third, in the attributes and qualifications which are required of Army leaders; and, fourth, in the training which is provided by the Army to develop those attributes and qualifications in its leaders. This four-fold division of subject matter will form the outline of the description of Army leadership contained in the remainder of this study.

A detailed examination of the approach of the Army to its own special problem of leadership will reveal the contribution of the methods and policies of the Army to the solution of the fundamental problem of leadership which confronts all bureaucratic organizations. It will also suggest certain general conclusions regarding the solution of the special problem of leadership of the civil administrative services of the federal government.

CHAPTER VI

OFFICER TRAINING METHODS

The material concerning military organization and leadership which has been presented thus far forms a background against which the methods employed in educating and training the officers of the Army may be seen in their proper perspectives. These methods have, of course, been created and developed to meet the particular needs of the Army, and they are of primary significance only in terms of those needs. The thesis of this study is, however, that the problem of developing capable leaders is in many respects similar in all large-scale organizations, and that the methods employed by the Army in training its leaders offer many interesting and valuable analogies to other large groups.

The problem of training occupies a predominant part of the Army's attention. Actual performance has, in time of peace, a small role compared with training for performance. With most of the energies and resources of the organization devoted to individual and group training, the result has been a body of theory and a series of practices which merit the close attention of students of large-scale organization.

Certain basic requirements underly all of the training provided by the Army for its officers. These requirements are by no means peculiar to the Army. They apply to all large-scale organizations, and sound methods for the training and development of the leaders of any bureaucratic group must conform in some degree to them. The first of these requirements is that the training must result in an actual ability to perform and to act, and

not in a mere understanding of what constitutes correct performance or action. Any group which professes to have definite goals of action must obviously put emphasis upon this quality in its leaders. The purpose of such a group is positive accomplishment, and as long as this remains true the individual who only comprehends techniques and who does not also possess the ability of translating that comprehension into action is not qualified for the leadership of the group.

Another requirement which officer training methods must satisfy is that of providing all of the individuals who direct and control the organization with a common basis of doctrine. The rational preparation and effective execution of a coherent plan of action for a large organization demands that all of the elements of the group be able to meet on a common level of language, ideology, and method. Control and leadership must be exerted over the group largely through the medium of written and spoken words, and if these convey different or conflicting meanings to different individuals the result will be confusion and impotence. There must exist a uniform doctrine concerning the proper performance of the functions of the group. This is not true merely of military organizations. The importance of doctrinal uniformity in large-scale industrial groups has been shown by Mooney and Reiley,¹ and it is essential in some degree in all other large-scale organizations.

A third requirement which is imposed on the officer training procedures of the Army is that of developing individuals who are capable of original and constructive thought. Doctrinal uniformity provides a necessary bond of union within the group, but it does not supplant individual judgment. The essence of the

¹Onward Industry!, pp. 301-02.

officer's role, and of the role of the leaders of all other large-scale organizations, is not the observance of hard and fast rules, but the provision of foresight and discretion, and the interpretation of policies and orders in the light of special circumstances, without which the group would rapidly disintegrate and be reduced to ineffectiveness.

The training received by officers includes, in a sense, all of their activities and experiences during their entire careers. Within this inclusive scope, however, several classifications may be made. One distinction which has been recognized is that between the military education of officers and their unit training.¹

Military education is the training received by an individual without regard to his membership in any particular unit of organization. It is carried out chiefly by means of the Army school system. The schools maintained by the Army which provide training for officers include: (a) the United States Military Academy, which gives a preliminary general education to prospective officers; (b) the special service schools, which give training in the special techniques of all of the arms, and most of the services; (c) the general service schools, which train officers for general staff duty and for high command; (d) the Army correspondence schools, which so far as the training of Regular Army officers is concerned, substitute for, or supplement the training given by certain of the other schools; and (3) the troop schools, where newly appointed officers receive basic instruction.² In addition to the schools maintained by the Army, officers also receive training at: (a) Civilian educational institutions and industrial establishments; (b) the Naval War College; and (c)

¹Training Regulations, No. 10-5, Sec. IV.

²Army Regulations, No. 350-5.

foreign military and language schools.¹

Unit training is the training of military organizations, including the training of individuals as members of such organizations. The object of this training is group efficiency, and the ability of individuals to take their parts in the activity of units. The training of officers in unit activity is attained partly through practice in the leadership of simple drills and exercises and partly through participation in various applicatory exercises.²

These applicatory exercises provide most of the formal unit training of officers. They are designed to give experience in the application of principles and methods of hypothetical situations. They may take many forms, including the following:

(a) map problems, in which a military situation is stated and solved in writing with the map the only guide as to terrain; (b) map maneuvers, in which a military operation, with opposing sides, is conducted on a map with the aid of markers; (c) tactical rides or walks, in which a series of military problems are stated and solved on the ground, the troops being imaginary; (d) terrain exercises, which are similar to tactical rides or walks, except that they are devoted to a single situation and are solved in writing; (e) staff rides or walks, in which staff operations are carried out in accordance with certain imaginary military requirements; (f) historical rides, in which past military operations are studied on the grounds on which they took place; (g) field exercises, in which operations are conducted in the field by an actual force against an imaginary enemy; (h) field maneuvers, in which opposing forces actually maneuver against each other in the field; and

¹Ibid.

²Training Regulations, No. 10-5, Sec. IV.

(1) joint Army and Navy exercises where both Army and Navy forces participate in actual maneuvers.¹

Another classification which is made of the training received by officers is the following:

The training of officers is continuous throughout their service.

Their theoretical instruction is accomplished by means of troop schools, the various schools of the military educational system, and by individual application and study.
. . . .

The practical training of officers is accomplished by actual experience in command or staff duties appropriate to their grades.²

This distinction between theoretical and practical training is very similar to the distinction which is made in most large-scale organizations between specialized training as such and actual performance. Theoretical training includes virtually all of the preliminary instruction which officers receive in the techniques and principles of their functions. Practical training is a general phrase which applies to all of an officer's experience in the actual performance of his duties in positions of authority and responsibility.

The methods by which officers are assigned to the positions in which they receive their practical training have already been examined. These methods are governed by general policies which are designed to broaden and to vary the experience of officers in command and staff positions, and to relate that experience to the theoretical and preparatory training of the officers. The practical training of an officer in each of the positions to which he is assigned is supervised and guided by his military superior. The extent of such supervision varies, of course, with the nature of the position.

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., Sec. VI.

Despite the fact that the training received by officers may be classified into military education and unit training, and into theoretical and practical training, the importance of these distinctions should not be overemphasized. All training is governed by the same basic principles, and is managed and conducted by essentially the same methods.

One principle which underlies all training is decentralization. While the formulation and enunciation of training policies and objectives is a function of higher command and of centralized control, the conduct of training is decentralized.¹

Another basic principle which guides officer training methods is the principle of progressive training. All training is intended to proceed from the elementary to the more advanced. The officer is trained as an individual at a series of institutions which are coordinated with each other, and at which the officer may advance from simple techniques and principles to the study of the broadest and most complex subjects pertaining to warfare. Similarly, the training which an officer receives in positions of authority and command proceeds from the relatively simple responsibilities of a lieutenant up to the inclusive and complex responsibilities of high command.

A third principle which underlies officer training methods is that of the applicatory system. "This system consists in causing the individual or unit under instruction to apply the principles or methods being taught, to an assumed or outlined situation simulating actual war conditions."² The importance of this principle lies partly in the absence during peace-time of other and more realistic opportunity for practice, but also largely in the instructional value which the technique has under any circum-

¹Ibid., Sec. III.

²Ibid.

stances. The importance attached by the War Department to the principle of the applicatory system reflects the necessity, which was noted earlier, for the development of active and not merely passive knowledge of techniques and principles.

The management of all training is based on the usual methods of military control. The military head of the whole Army is, of course, the Chief of Staff. All basic training policies are established under his ultimate supervision. He exercises, through appropriate agencies, direct control over a part of the officer training program, but he also delegates a large portion of his responsibilities to various commanding officers. In general, the rule is that training is a function of command.¹ Thus, the Chief of Staff, who may for practical purposes be viewed as the commander of all of the Army, is charged not only with a general responsibility for the training of the entire Army, but also with the direct control of such training as does not pertain specifically to any single subordinate unit or organization. In this capacity the Chief of Staff controls, through the chiefs of arms and services and through the commandants of certain schools, the theoretical training of officers for general staff work and for higher command, and, through the chiefs of the arms and services, all training of officers in tactical and technical functions which are not limited in their scope to a single subordinate unit of organization. Commanders under the Chief of Staff control the training of officers subject to their jurisdiction to the extent that is necessary to insure the ability of those officers to accomplish their programs. Thus, for example, the commanders of the four armies supervise the special training of the commanders and staffs of the various major units within their armies. Similar-

¹Ibid., Sec. V.

ly, corps area and department commanders are charged with broad responsibilities concerning the training of officers under their command. Below corps area and department commanders, the commanders of local posts or camps are responsible for the introductory training of newly appointed officers, and for the supervision of the activities of all other officers.

Each officer who is responsible for the management of training utilizes several more or less standardized administrative practices. These practices or methods are well designed to promote thoroughness and effectiveness in training. The first step in training management is the preparation of a detailed analysis of the training situation. In this analysis are summarized the various factors which have an important bearing upon training. These factors are listed in a military publication¹ as follows:

- a. Mission (training objective)
- b. Essential subjects (relative importance and scope of each)
- c. Time available
- d. Equipment and facilities available
- e. Personnel available
- f. Local conditions
- g. Existing state of training
- h. Organization for training
- i. Obstacles to training
 - (1) Administrative
 - (2) Physical
 - (3) Human

Of these factors that of the mission, or the training objective, is regarded as the most important. The officer who is in charge of the training must understand thoroughly what he is

¹Training Management, Special Text No. 180, Army Extension Courses (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), p. 36.

expected to accomplish. The instructions which have been received from higher authority must be studied and analyzed, and the officer must visualize what those instructions require of his unit in terms of concrete accomplishment. The other factors included on the list bear an obvious relationship to training management, and they, together with any other matters which affect the training situation, should be considered in the preliminary analysis.

After these data are assembled and carefully studied, the officer in charge of the training draws up a detailed program in which he announces the plan of training for his unit over a considerable period of time. The scope and content of training programs depend largely upon the size and character of the commands or units for which they are issued.

By his training program the commander outlines and explains the general plan and scope of training for his unit or units, designating schools to be conducted and individuals to attend them, subjects to be covered and officers charged with their control, standards of proficiency demanded, responsibilities of subordinates for various phases of training, coordination of matters which affect training and are beyond the control of subordinates, and the dates, scope, and character of inspections.¹

After the training program is issued the commander then undertakes the final task of seeing that the various standards which are prescribed are actually attained. This task consists essentially of discovering and clearing away the obstacles which impede training, and in the performance of this duty the commander relies upon inspections.

Inspections vary as much according to the size and character of the command or unit concerned as do training programs. The daily observation and guidance which is the essence of super-

¹Field Artillery Training, Special Text No. 99, Army Extension Courses (Ft. Sill, Oklahoma: The Field Artillery School Printing Plant, 1931), p. 12.

vision may be regarded as one type of inspection. Prearranged inspections are also made from time to time in order to test the progress of individuals and units in accomplishing the training objectives. There is no single form which is prescribed for all inspections. They may be of such a character as the officer making the inspections thinks will best accomplish his purposes.

Inspections of all kinds have an obviously close relationship to standards of performance. The training program issued by the commander announces and describes certain standards which are to be attained, and numerous War Department publications provide reference matter which can be used as guides in establishing standards. It is necessary for the officer who is supervising the training actually to create the standards in each case, however. Standards of performance, even of the simpler technical and mechanical tasks, are not created by a mere paper description. They are living things, and to a considerable extent the head of the unit is himself the master standard.

Thus the process of training management includes three steps. First, all the pertinent data concerning the training to be undertaken is assembled and analyzed. Second, the basis of this analysis a training program is drawn up which specifies the plan of training in such detail as is appropriate to the unit. Finally, the officer in charge of the training conducts regular and systematic inspections to see that the training produces abilities which measure up to the standards of performance announced by the training program.

The training which an officer receives (in the course of his career) may be divided into several well-defined stages. Before he secures his commission he receives a preliminary general education. After the officer obtains his commission he enters

upon a course of introductory training which is designed to give him a working familiarity with his basic duties. When this introductory training is completed, the officer undergoes a period of intensive specialized training, in which he learns the technique and methods of his functional specialty (that is, arm or service). After that training is accomplished, a limited number of officers who have shown outstanding promise are given training in the methods and principles of general staff duty and in the command of large units of organization. These stages of training—preliminary, introductory, specialized and general—may be taken as the basis for further examination of officer training methods.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND APPLICATIONS TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The fundamental problem of bureaucratic leadership arises out of the assumption that a bureaucracy is an instrument or agency for the achievement of definite objectives. The efficient attainment of those objectives necessitates guidance and control of the bureaucracy by a rational intelligence which is capable of understanding the goals of the organization and of planning and directing programs of action which will accomplish those aims. The problem of leadership which confronts large-scale organizations is concerned with all of the organizational and administrative aspects of the activity of those groups which influence and make possible their effective supervision and control.

Certain major elements of this problem have been identified.¹ It is first necessary that an organizational framework be created for each group which will enable its leaders to exercise effective guidance over its actions. The fundamental difference between the functions and qualifications of bureaucratic leaders, and the functions and qualifications of subordinate members of large-scale organizations must be clearly recognized and some method for the selection of able leaders must be devised which will be consistent with the maintenance of the morale of the group. Finally, the leaders of the organization must receive adequate training to enable them to perform their duties.

These elements of the problem of leadership are common to all large-scale organizations and may be said to constitute the

¹Supra, pp. 33-36.

fundamental problem of bureaucratic leadership. The special circumstances of the environment and function of each individual bureaucracy determine the specific nature of the problem of leadership which must be solved by each group. Thus there is a special problem of leadership for each large-scale organization.

The methods and policies by which the United States Army has attempted to solve its own special problem of leadership have been surveyed. The structural forms through which leadership is exercised over the group, the sources from which Army leaders are selected, the status and personal qualifications of leaders of the Army, and the training which is received by those leaders have been examined. It is now possible to make an appraisal of this solution which will form the basis for general conclusions regarding the significance of Army methods and policies for the problem of leadership in the civil administrative services of the federal government.

The organization of the Army is well adapted to the effective exercise of leadership. The hierarchy of command, which may be regarded as the framework upon which all of the structure of the Army is built, provides a channel for the rapid and effective transmission of orders and policies from the center of control to all members of the group. Each individual within the Army has certain well-defined duties for which he is completely responsible to his immediate superior. Hence, the responsibility for any action or situation can be swiftly and correctly determined. No officer has more than a very limited number of subordinates directly under his supervision. This provides the sine qua non of effective hierarchical leadership, namely, the opportunity for a close personal contact between each officer and his immediate subordinates.

The Army is divided into broad but distinct functional groupings. All members of the Army, with the exception of general officers of the line, are attached to one of these functional classifications, or branches. Each branch performs one well-defined phase of the total activity of the Army. Some branches are primarily devoted to combatant functions while others provide the essential services of supply and facilitation without which the combatant branches would be unable to operate. Thus, there is a clear-cut division of effort within the Army which enables the group to conduct complex and technical activities with efficiency and dispatch.

Since the hierarchical leaders of all but the smaller units of organization are responsible for the combined activity of many different functional classifications it is necessary that they be assisted by technical experts who possess an extensive knowledge of functional specialties. That is to say, there is a need for functionalized leadership to supplement the inclusive leadership exercised by hierarchical officials. Army organization supplies this need adequately by assigning officers to each of the major levels of command to supervise, under the general direction of their commander, the specialized and technical activities of the various functional groupings included within the unit. Such officers are not hierarchical leaders, since they do not command any of the units of military organization. Their contribution to the effective guidance and control of the Army is, nevertheless, very important since they supply the intimate knowledge of technical processes and operations which is essential to the success of complex activities.

Finally, the organization of the Army makes possible the exercise of effective leadership because it furnishes coordinative

or general staff assistance to hierarchical leaders in the upper levels of command. The duties of many commanders are so extensive and complex that those officers would be unable to function efficiently if they were aided only by technical specialists. The mass and variety of details which must be supervised and controlled by such commanders make it imperative that they be assisted also by coordinative specialists who sift and focus details into a manageable scope. Accordingly, the commanders of all of the larger units of military organization are provided with general staffs. The members of these general staffs, who may be regarded as the coordinative leaders of the Army, make an indispensable contribution to the guidance and control of the group.

Having created an organizational framework which makes possible the exercise of effective leadership, the Army has next established a method for the selection of able leaders, which is consistent with the maintenance of the morale of the group. The hierarchical leaders of all units of the Army except the two smallest (squads and sections), and all functionalized and coordinative leaders are chosen from a special classification within the group. That classification is composed of commissioned officers. Promotion from rank to rank within that classification (but not into it) depends largely upon length of service. Specific positions of leadership are filled by commissioned officers partly on the basis of their ranks and partly as a result of their individual records and qualifications.

Three outstanding results emerge from this method of selecting leaders. The first is that it makes possible the creation of conditions of service for commissioned officers which are adequate to attract individuals of a high average of native ability. Since all positions of leadership are reserved for

commissioned officers, all such officers have an opportunity for varied and responsible activity, and all may expect regular promotion throughout their service. Commissioned officers occupy positions of great importance and prestige within the Army. The pay of officers is sufficient to provide the material basis for an honorable and well-rounded career, and the retired pay which they receive makes adequate provision for their old age. Hence, there is a reasonable expectation that the type of personnel which enters the commissioned officer group will have sufficient ability for the performance of the functions of Army leadership.

The method by which the leaders of any bureaucracy are selected must be consistent with the maintenance of the particular type of morale which is necessary for that group. A second important result of the Army's method of leadership recruitment is that it permits the maintenance of the type of morale needed by the Army. It is not as important for the Army as it is for some other large-scale organizations to provide an opportunity for subordinate members of the group to advance to the higher positions of the organization. The extremely sharp cleavage between leaders and subordinates which is found in the Army might well be injurious to the morale of many bureaucratic organizations, but the special nature of military activity justifies this cleavage in the case of the Army.

The third major result of the Army's method of selecting its leaders is that it makes it possible to provide for officers the training and experience which are necessary to fit them for the effective performance of their duties. Since it is known at the time of the initial appointment of an officer that he is destined to be one of the leaders of the organization it is possible to commence at once a systematic program for developing in him

the qualities and knowledge which are necessary for military leadership. This training can then be carried forward throughout the officer's career. A normal course of advancement and promotion can be established and training and experience can then be given to the officer to qualify him for each stage of his progress.

The final aspect of the Army's solution of its leadership problem which deserves mention in this appraisal is the procedure by which officers are trained and developed. The education and practical experience which officers receive is, for the most part, well calculated to produce the attributes required in military leaders.

The preliminary training of officers usually consists of the course of instruction of the United States Military Academy. This course lays a broad educational foundation which contributes greatly to the ultimate efficiency of officers by furnishing them with the background which is necessary for their further progress and development.

The practical experience and special education and training which officers receive from the time of their first assignments as active members of the Army are carefully directed toward the development of the qualities necessary for hierarchical, functionalized, and coordinative leadership. Commencing with the simple and limited duties of a second lieutenant, an officer proceeds in sequence through the ranks of first lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel and colonel. Thereafter he may be selected as a general officer. With each rise in rank, the duties and responsibilities of an officer increase in extent and complexity, and the scope and variety of his experience is accordingly widened.

Parallel with the sequence of the practical experience of

officers is the training which they receive at various special centers of instruction. Troop schools make an important and valuable contribution to the initial orientation of newly appointed officers. Special service schools and civilian educational institutions provide essential instruction in the techniques and methods of the functional specialties of the Army. General service schools, the Naval War College, and various types of instruction abroad give selected officers training which helps to fit them for the highest positions of Army leadership. The rapidly expanding extension course system furnishes a sequence of training which is useful in almost all stages in the development of officers.

The results of the training methods of the Army in terms of the number of officers who are trained for hierarchical, functionalized, and coordinative leadership may be stated as follows. Most of the officers of the Army have been trained as functionalized leaders and as the hierarchical leaders of the smaller units of organization by means of extensive instruction and experience which they have received in the technique and tactics of one of the functional classifications of the Army. A much smaller number of officers (less than one-fifth of the total) have received training as hierarchical and coordinative leaders of units of organization extending in size up to and including the corps. A very much smaller group (approximately one-twelfth of the total) have received training as hierarchical and coordinative leaders of the largest and most inclusive units of military organization.

The problem of leadership of the Army is fundamentally comparable to the problem of leadership of all other bureaucratic organizations. Hence, the methods and policies which comprise the solution of the Army for its problem of leadership have a

general significance for the problem of leadership found in all other large-scale organizations. It is therefore permissible to seek applications of the experience and practice of the Army to the solution of the problem of leadership of the civil administrative services of the federal government.

In the first place, the effectiveness of the hierarchical, functional, and coordinative organization of the Army points the way toward necessary improvements in the structural framework through which guidance and control are exerted over the national administrative services. The President is responsible for the supervision and direction of all branches of the federal administration. He is charged with the duty of guiding the administrative agencies of the federal government toward the accomplishment of the objectives set for them by legislation and by executive orders. However, the hierarchy of authority through which the President must reach the personnel of the national administrative services is so constructed as virtually to preclude the exercise of effective control over those services.

The first principle of hierarchical organization is that no individual, however gifted he may be, should be responsible for personally guiding the work of more than a very limited number of subordinates. Military experience suggests that from six to eight is the average number of individuals who can be supervised by one person. However, a chart, published on March 2, 1936, by the United States Information Service, reveals that no less than fifty-five agencies, exclusive of the cabinet, are in direct contact with the President. When it is recalled that a major portion of the attention of the President is necessarily devoted to legislative matters, the magnitude of his administrative burden becomes even more apparent.

Before the assumption that the entire federal administration is guided by rational and coherent policy can be made a reality it will be necessary to reduce materially the number of agencies which are placed directly under the authority of the President. While gradual progress in this direction is possible, it would appear that the gravity of the present maladjustment makes necessary a fundamental reorganization and regrouping of the federal administrative services.

The heads of many of the subordinate units of administrative organization are confronted by the same problem as is the President. Some are expected to direct as many as fifteen to twenty different internal groups and agencies. The reform of the federal hierarchy should include not only a great reduction of the number of units placed under the President, but also a systematic limitation of the number of units which are under the control of any single official throughout the entire hierarchy. This would lay the foundation of an organizational framework which would make possible the exercise of effective supervision and control over the federal administration.

In addition to a satisfactory hierarchical organization, there is need in the civil administrative services for a careful and systematic distribution of functional responsibilities. An orderly and effective division of labor is essential to the success of the federal administration in the performance of complex and extensive tasks. Reform in this direction might well proceed hand in hand with the reorganization of the federal hierarchy.

If the various activities of the federal administration were grouped into functionally defined units, two important results would follow. In the first place, it would become easier to exercise effective supervision and control over the entire range

of activity of the federal services. The elements out of which must be shaped a program of federal action to accomplish any desired result would be arranged in simple and easily accessible formations. The combination and distribution of those elements by administrative and executive officials would be an easier process than it is at present, when cooperative action must frequently be secured across major boundaries of administrative organization, even though the agencies concerned are closely related to each other in function.

A second result of the functional grouping of federal administrative services would be the development of improved techniques and methods. A pooling of the knowledge and experience of functionally related agencies throughout the federal administration would doubtless produce a better understanding of common problems, which, in turn, would result in new and more effective approaches to the solution of those problems.

Reforms in hierarchical and functional organization would greatly facilitate the exercise of effective leadership over the federal administrative services. In addition to such improvements, however, there is also an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of federal administrative leadership by the establishment of more adequate methods of coordination.

In military structure, hierarchical leaders of the major units of organization are furnished with general staffs. The duties of these general staffs consist of coordinating and focusing the details of the business of their leaders. The purpose of their services is to enable commanders to lead their units without being swamped by a mass of detail.

The need for such services undoubtedly exists in the civil administrative agencies. The President is charged with a stagger-

ing administrative burden which is complicated by the inadequacies of federal hierarchical and functional organization. In order for him to exercise supervision over the activities of the federal administration he receives a certain degree of coordinative assistance from several sources. His private secretaries sift and regulate much of his business. The cabinet, when actually in session, may be regarded as an agency for the coordination of the President's administrative duties, although it has many other functions, and is composed of officials who themselves have great administrative responsibilities. The National Emergency Council, acting through its administrative officials, endeavors to provide for the orderly presentation of business to the President and to coordinate problems of organization and activity which arise among the various federal agencies in Washington and in the field. The Bureau of the Budget coordinates the financial requirements of federal agencies, and, at the direction of the President, makes detailed studies of the activities of those agencies to enable the President to determine what changes should be made in the interests of economy and efficiency.

There is no organized body in the federal administration which furnishes the President with exactly the same type of assistance as that which a military commander receives from his general staff. Such a body would, if established, be recognized and accepted as a virtual extension of the personality of the President. Any administrative action which would be proper for the President himself would be suitable for his coordinative agency, providing such action was clearly in line with some expressed policy or desire of the President. The flow of administrative business up to the President from all branches and divisions of the federal government would be regulated by such a body,

and after the President had arrived at decisions of policy, the coordinative agency would translate those decisions into specific orders and directions, and would supervise their execution.

An agency of this nature would not be composed of the heads of important administrative subdivisions of the federal government, as are the cabinet and National Emergency Council, for such officials have administrative duties of their own which would hinder their performance of coordinative duties. The agency would be composed of experienced officials chosen from various sections of the federal administration who would devote their entire time to the work of coordination.

The establishment of such an agency would result in a great increase in the effectiveness of the administrative leadership of the President. He would be relieved of much of the detailed burden of his office, and would be able to concentrate his full attention upon the determination of major goals and objectives. A permanent, and fully-developed agency of coordination, would go far toward alleviating the difficulties occasioned by the hierarchical and functional maladjustments of the federal government. Through it, the President could control effectively a much wider range of activity than is possible at present. Such an agency would bring much nearer to reality the assumption that the federal administrative services are firmly guided and directed in accordance with rational and coherent policy.

The same advantages which would be gained by providing the President with a special agency of coordination would also be secured on a smaller scale by furnishing the heads of certain of the major subdivisions of the federal administration with similar agencies of coordination. The effectiveness of the leadership of those officials would thereby be increased, and the

responsiveness of the federal administration as a whole to unified control would be greatly improved.

The creation of a structural framework which makes possible the exercise of effective supervision and control is merely the first step in the solution of the problem of bureaucratic leadership. After that step is taken it is necessary to devise some means for the selection of able leaders which is consistent with the maintenance of the morale of the particular bureaucracy concerned, and to provide those leaders with training which fits them for their duties.

The basic possibilities with regard to the selection of bureaucratic leaders have been identified as selection from outside the organization, selection from a special classification within the group, selection from the group at large, and promotion to positions of leadership on the basis of seniority.¹ All bureaucratic organizations secure their leaders from one or more of these sources.

The federal administrative agencies obtain their leaders from outside the organization, by selection from the group at large, and by promotion as a result of seniority. Little or no systematic policy governs the use which is made of these three methods.

The leaders of the Army are selected from a special classification within the group. That classification is composed of commissioned officers. Promotion and selection of individuals within the classification are governed by definite and well-established policies. Consequently, the lines of advancement to the upper positions of the organization are clearly marked.

The selection of bureaucratic leaders from a special

¹Supra, pp. 36-40.

classification within the group produces two very desirable consequences. First, it becomes possible to attract a superior type of personnel to enter the classification because a definite opportunity is afforded to its members to advance to high and responsible positions. Second, the systematic development of the qualifications necessary for bureaucratic leadership can be commenced as soon as an individual enters the classification and can be continued throughout his career. These results contribute greatly to the effectiveness of the leadership of any bureaucratic organization. The value of this method of selection of leaders is evidenced by the fact that the highly developed national administrative services of Great Britain and France make use of it.

The selection of the administrative and executive officials of the federal government from a special personnel classification similar to the commissioned officer group of the Army, or to the administrative and executive classes of the French and British civil services, would probably produce an abler and better trained group of officials, on the whole, than are obtained by the present unsystematic methods of selection. However, in spite of the possible advantages of such a step it seems highly unlikely that it would be consistent with the maintenance of good morale in American governmental services. The creation of such a classification would doubtless be strongly opposed by all organized groups of government employees, and much bitterness would be felt by all those who were excluded from the classification. Many employees would feel that such a method of selection violated the American tradition of equal opportunity.

The selection of bureaucratic leaders from outside the organization makes possible the choice of officials with proven administrative ability, or with special technical training. These

are important considerations, and they make this type of selection valuable in many instances. However, the use of this method by the federal administrative agencies should be restricted to a small scope, because it decreases the opportunity for promotion and thus tends to have injurious effects upon morale. The development of a genuine career system in the federal government requires that most of the higher administrative and executive positions be filled by promotion or selection from within the organization.

The selection of bureaucratic leaders as a result of seniority is indefensible as a general policy, although restricted applications of the seniority principle are sometimes beneficial. This method of selection offers little or no advantages to the federal administrative agencies. It certainly lays no basis for a career system in the true sense of that phrase.

The selection of bureaucratic leaders from the group at large may be, if properly applied, the best possible method of selection. It is conducive to good morale because it affords some opportunity for high and rapid promotion to all members of the organization. It permits the selection of the ablest members of the group, and it makes possible their thorough and systematic training for the duties of leadership.

This method of selection would seem to be the one which should be given greatest use by the federal administrative agencies. Its most effective employment will not be possible, however, until two requirements are satisfied. First, there must be complete and detailed personnel records available upon which to base selections. Second, avenues of promotion must run unimpeded from the lowest to the highest positions. If those conditions are satisfied, this method of selection will make possible the choice of able leaders and will, at the same time, be consistent with the

maintenance of good morale in the federal administrative services.

Following the initial selection of bureaucratic leaders it is necessary that those leaders receive training to qualify them for their functions. The provision of such training constitutes the third and final step in the solution of the problem of bureaucratic leadership.

The training which the administrative and executive officials of the federal government receive consists principally of their experience in the performance of their duties. As a recent study has shown, there has been a considerable development of specialized in-service training in the federal government.¹ However, a very great proportion of such training is designed to qualify individuals for relatively subordinate positions, and not to fit them for advancement to high administrative and executive posts.

The training of the leaders of the Army also consists, in a large part, of experience in positions of authority. That experience is carefully supervised by central agencies, and is, in general, varied and well-balanced. In addition to the training which they receive from their experience, however, Army officers obtain training from numerous special agencies of instruction. These two types of training supplement each other and are closely coordinated.

The Army's system of training tends to prevent the overspecialization of the knowledge and outlook of its officers, and at the same time it standardizes technical processes and methods. A similar system of training would be very beneficial for the administrative and executive officials of the federal government.

¹J. E. Devine, Post-Entry Training in the Federal Service (Mimeographed and Circulated by Courtesy of the Public Administration Fund, University of Chicago, August, 1935).

The experience of those officials should be regarded as the basic source of their training. It should be carefully supervised, as in the Army, and it should be varied enough, and well-balanced enough to furnish a wide personal acquaintance with the problems and methods of the federal administrative agencies.

With such experience should also be provided an opportunity for specialized training or instruction. While much can be learned from experience alone, if properly varied, and if secured under able supervision, the complexity and magnitude of the activities of the federal government make it necessary that its leaders possess technical and specialized qualifications which cannot ordinarily be obtained except from some form of special instruction. This instruction should be closely coordinated with the experience of federal officials.

Two valuable results could be achieved from a well-developed program of special training for administrative and executive officials. First, those officials' knowledge of the special techniques and processes of their own divisions or agencies could be developed, and, second, their understanding of the general problems confronting government, and of the methods and procedures of the federal government as a whole could be improved.

The Army's training methods suggest several types of special training which would contribute to the accomplishment of these results. Training centers similar to the special service schools of the Army might be created by each of the major administrative units of the federal government. These training agencies would serve to improve and to standardize the administrative methods of the officials of those units. Central agencies of instruction analogous to general service schools might be established to provide higher officials throughout the federal government with

a means for the exchange and improvement of their ideas and knowledge concerning broad problems of government and administration. The range of influence of such agencies of instruction could be greatly increased by conducting an extension course system in close cooperation with them, as is done by the Army.

A more general use might profitably be made of university training for federal administrative and executive officials. Such training forms an important part of the training of Army officers. The federal administrative services would also profit from sending a few officials abroad each year to study and report on the administrative methods of foreign governments. This would be comparable to the Army's practice of providing foreign military and language instruction for its officers. There would appear to be no useful role, however, within the federal administrative services for an institution analogous to the Military Academy, unless an administrative or executive class were created which would be filled by the graduates of such an institution. Otherwise the institution would merely duplicate the functions of colleges and universities throughout the nation. The creation of such an institution might be justified as a step toward the establishment of a national university, but it could not be justified on the grounds of its value for the training of federal officials.

The problem of obtaining able and effective leadership for the federal administrative agencies is already acute. If the present social importance of the activity of the federal government is to continue, some permanent and dependable solution for that problem must be devised. The basic lesson to be learned by the civil administrative services from the Army's experience is that the problem is concerned with three interdependent and closely

related factors. The first is the organizational framework through which leadership is exercised. The second is the method by which leaders are selected. The third is the means by which leaders are trained. Each of these constituent parts of the problem must be solved before effective guidance and control will be exercised over the federal administrative agencies.

